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How Novelty Arises from Fields of
Experience
A Comparison Between W. James and A. N. Whitehead
Maria Regina Brioschi
 
I. The “Re-coloration” of James, according to
Whitehead
1 Before understanding and comparing the authors’ thoughts from the perspective of their
conceptions of experience, it is necessary to clarify and explain what is their connection,
from a historical-critical point of view. Indeed, the relationship subsisting between James
and Whitehead has been noticed from the very outset by the critical  scholarship on
Whitehead, as is testified by the presence of articles that appeared before the author’s
death.1 Such concern is due not only to the fact that Whitehead inaugurates the properly
speculative phase of his thought in 1924,2 the same year in which he is called to teach at
Harvard  University,  nor  even  simply  to  a  peculiar  affinity  in  terms  of  interests  or
temperament.
2 Granted  that  James  is  cited  by  Whitehead  in  the  preface  of  his  Process  and  Reality,
alongside Bergson and Dewey, as evidence of his intellectual debt towards these authors,
the place reserved for him in the peculiar history of philosophy outlined in Science and the
Modern World holds a prominent relevance, which stands in need of clarification, if not of
proper  justification.  By  way  of  example,  let  us  consider  a  passage  from  the
aforementioned work:
It is an exaggeration to attribute a general change in a climate of thought to any
one piece  of  writing,  or  to  any one author.  No doubt  Descartes  only  expressed
definitely  and  in  decisive  form  what  was  already  in  the  air  of  his  period.
Analogously,  in attributing to William James the inauguration of a new stage in
philosophy, we should be neglecting other influences of his time. But, admitting
this, there still remains a certain fitness in contrasting his essay, Does Consciousness
Exist?,  published in 1904, with Descartes’s Discourse on Method,  published in 1637.
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James clears the stage of the old paraphernalia; or rather he entirely alters its lighting
. (SMW: 143)3
3 Throughout an original critical re-examination of the modern history of philosophy and
science,  in this excerpt Whitehead equates the “genius”4 of  the seventeenth century,
Descartes, with James, correspondingly targeted as the genius of the nineteenth century.
It is therefore inevitable to pose the following questions: why does Whitehead address
James as the genius of the nineteenth century? Why does he “entirely alter the stage lighting
”?
4 The first step towards an understanding of the momentous function of James, according
to Whitehead, is that of getting a grasp of both the subject matter and the purpose of
Science and the Modern World.  In the introductory pages, Whitehead maintains that the
thesis he means to develop in the text can find expression in the idea that the “quiet
growth of science has practically recoloured our mentality” (SMW: 2). And that is not all,
because  these  “modes  of  thought  which  in  former  times  were  exceptional  are  now
broadly spread through the educated world” (SMW: 2). Consequently, this change can be
traced of course in terms of scientific methodology and philosophical premises, but must
be especially comprehended in terms of mentality, because – according to Whitehead –
“the  new  mentality  is  more  important  even  than  the  new  science  and  the  new
technology” (SMW: 2).  The first  aspect through which he addresses such a mentality
consists in a renewed and constant attention for particular facts. The author highlights:
What I mean is just that slightest change of tone which yet makes all the difference.
This is exactly illustrated by a sentence from a published letter of that adorable
genius, William James. When he was finishing his great treatise on the Principles of
Psychology, he wrote to his brother Henry James, “I have to forge every sentence in
the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts.” (SMW: 2-3)
5 The change of tone is therefore determined by the primary interest accorded to stubborn
facts. But by laying stress on this aspect, Whitehead does not mean so much as to become
the champion of a vague and naïve emphasis on mere facts5 as he does to invoke the same
orientation attitude which James outlines well in What Pragmatism means, where he claims
that pragmatism is that “attitude of  looking away from first  things,  principles,  ‘categories,’
supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts” (WWJ1: 32).
6 Strictly  speaking,  for  Whitehead  this  change  can  be  easily  clarified  by  the  brief
comparison between the results produced by Descartes’s and James’s thoughts. Indeed, on
the one hand Whitehead claims that, in virtue of the clear-cut distinction between matter
and consciousness worked out by Descartes, “after the close of the seventeenth century,
science  took  charge  of  the  materialistic  nature,  and  philosophy  took  charge  if  the
cogitating minds” (SMW: 145), and that this perpetration of such a rigid dualism has led
to “unfortunate limitations of thought on both sides. Philosophy has ceased to claim its
proper generality, and natural science is content with the narrow round of its methods”
(FR: 50). On the other he observes that “we have now come to a critical period of the
general  reorganization  of  categories  of  scientific  thought.  Also  sciences,  such  as
psychology and physiology, are hovering on the edge of the crevasse separating science
from philosophy” (FR: 50), and for Whitehead James is the most prominent champion of
such a reorganization.6
7 As far  as  the  change in  mentality  is  concerned,  we might  say  that  the  paradigm of
scientific materialism has begun to fade away since the nineteenth century, so paving the
way  for  an  organicistic  conception  which,  starting  from  the  primacy  accorded  to
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experience,  acknowledges  that  “the concrete  fact,  which is  the  organism,  must  be  a
complete  expression  of  the  character of  a  real  occurrence.  Such  a  displacement  of
scientific materialism, if it ever takes place, cannot fail to have important consequences
in every field of thought” (SMW: 38-39).
8 From another point of view, if “the ancient world takes its stand upon the drama of the
Universe,  [and]  the modern world upon the inward drama of  the Soul”  (SMW:  141),
nowadays drama is represented by ‘event,’ conceived of as a primeval and primary unity
of universe and soul. Thus, one might agree with Whitehead in claiming that:
The materialistic starting point is from independently existing substances, matter
and mind. The matter suffers modifications of its external relations of locomotion,
and the mind suffers modifications of its contemplated objects. There are, in this
materialistic theory, two sorts of independent substances, each qualified by their
appropriate passions. The organic starting point is from the analysis of process as the
realization of events disposed in an interlocked community. The event is the unit of things
real. (SMW: 152-153)7
9 Thanks to such a swift journey throughout Whitehead’s thought, it is now clearer why
that ‘adorable genius,’ as he defines James, occupies such a central place in his historical
and theoretical analysis. Having concluded this preliminary part, we might now safely
venture ourselves into more specific aspects of the influence which James exerted on
Whitehead.
 
II. Comparing Philosophies: The Role of Reason and
Experience
10 If, as it has been shown so far, Whitehead’s appreciation of James is undeniable,8 it will be
now necessary to identify the specific elements of influence, and then proceed to the
confrontation between the two authors with reference to the problem of novelty.9
11 First of all, from the point of view of both method and setting the authors have similar
requirements, which can be grouped into three different and salient conceptual points,
namely 1) The task and role of the philosophical praxis, in agreement with a properly
antiintellectualistic  instance;  2)  The “prospective” (WWJ1:  53)  and dynamic nature of
reason (and hence of philosophy); 3) Empiricism and the absolute primacy of experience.
10
12 (1) For both authors the very first function of philosophy (or of the pragmatic method)
consists in offering an instrument able to unveil and sort out those controversies of the
abstract thought, which depend on misplaced assumptions and metaphysical premises, by
way of reduction or reference to the field of experience. Just as – Sini claims – “more than
to  ‘re-solve’  problems  and  to  inspire  definite  beliefs,  the  pragmatic maxim helps  to
‘dissolve,'  to  show that  they are  ‘false  problems’”  (Sini  2000:  15),11 in  the  same way
Whitehead  maintains  that  the  first  function  of  philosophy  is  to  be  a  “critic  of
abstractions” (SMW: 88), throughout a reference to experience as the utmost concretum:
in  fact,  on  the  author’s  view,  “the  elucidation  of  immediate  experience  is  the  sole
justification for any thought” (PR: 4), whereas thought, qua abstract, always runs the risk
of getting impaired by the so called “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (SMW: 52). All the
same,  a  meaningful  difference ought  to  be  considered with respect  to  this  resort  to
experience, in an anti-intellectual perspective. Indeed, for Whitehead the appeal to facts
has a derivative  intent,  while  for  James it  has an applicative  one.  In other words,  the
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unveiling of preconceived theses occurs, in the case of Whitehead, through the referral of 
a given concept to the field of the ex- perience from which it derives its origin; whereas, in
the case of James, it occurs through the confrontation with the consequences which the
concept at issue might bring about. As James states: “The pragmatic method is primarily a
method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. […] The
pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective
practical consequences. What the difference would it practically make to any one if this
notion rather than that notion were true?” (WWJ1: 28).
13 (2) Secondly, in order to understand the specific nature of this philosophical attitude, it is
necessary, on the one hand, to catch a glimpse of the methodological perspective adopted
by both authors and, on the other, to understand the possibilities and the nature they
acknowledge to reason. In this respect, it might be useful to oppose the thought of James
and Whitehead to the rationalistic tendencies proper to traditional philosophy. As James
himself suggests:
The essential contrast is that for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete
from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the makings and awaits part of
its complexion from the future. On the one side the universe is absolutely secure,
on the other it is still pursuing its ad- ventures (WWJ1: 123).
14 As  James  stresses  in  a  more  articulated  way  in  his  A  Pluralistic  Universe  –  if,  qua 
rationalists, “you have broken the reality into concepts you never can reconstruct it in its
wholeness. Out of no amount of discreteness can you manufacture the concrete” (WWJ4:
116). On the contrary – and this is exactly his pragmatic invitation – one should pose one-
self “in the making by a stroke of intuitive sympathy with the thing […]. Philosophy should
seek this kind of living understanding of the movement of reality, not follow science in
vainly patching together fragments of its dead results” (WWJ4: 117-18).
15 If the echo of Bergson resounds in such an invitation, it is nevertheless true that the
immediacy  and  sympathy,  indicated  as  a  way  towards  an  effective  knowledge  of
experience, do not correspond to a form of intuitionism able to pave the way for the
irrational and to distrusts reason in its power to positively grasp the items internal to
“the living, moving, active thickness of the real” (WWJ4: 116). Rather, it is a matter of an
opening and an understanding that differ from the retrospective analysis to which we use
to  associate  the  employment  and  the  function  of  reason.  What  are  therefore  the
possibilities and the modalities proper to the philosophical progression here introduced,
as well as to reason – understood as its tool? First and foremost, as James points out in
Pragmatism  by  criticizing  Spencer’s  stance,  philosophy  is  not  simply  retrospective:
“philosophy is prospective also, and, after finding what the world has been and done, and
yielded, still asks the further question ‘what does the world promise?’” (WWJ1: 53).12 What
clearly  re-emerges  here  is  that  dimension of  becoming  (and properly  of  the  future)
situated at the core of the distinctive concreteness of the real movement described above.
This is properly the direction pursued by radical empiricism, as James specifies in his
Essays in Radical Empiricism:
Understanding backwards is,  it  must  be confessed,  a  very frequent weakness  of
philosophers, both of the rationalistic and of the ordinary empiricist type. Radical
empiricism alone insists on understanding forwards also,  and refuses to substitute static
concepts of the understanding for transitions in our moving life. A logic similar to that
which my critic seems to employ here should, it seems to me, forbid him to say that
our present is, while present, directed towards our future. (WWJ3: 121)13
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16 The  pragmatic  method  addresses  the  future,  the  facts,  the  (possible)  practical
implications of a given idea in order to assess it. The kind of world it takes issue with is a
world being constantly in fieri; therefore, its investigation is bent onwards with respect to
the same concepts on which philosophy usually hinges. The function of philosophy – and
that  of  reason  (pragmatically  conceived)  –  emerges  into  light  while  frontally  facing
change  and  becoming,  without  exhausting  itself  in  its  own  distinctive  retrospective
analytic. What does philosophy consist of, then? How can it be described? With regard to
this, it will be useful to make use of some passage of Whitehead, extremely akin to the
position just expounded and taken from a short text published in 1929: Function of Reason.
14 In this work, which a substantial part of the Whiteheadian scholarship has not hesitated
to define “the most straightforward, and in many ways the most suggestive and delightful
of Whitehead’s books” (Emmett 1966: 11), the author takes into account the concept of
reason without confining himself to analyzing it in terms of the essence of the human
being, but rather analyzing it as a “cosmic force,”15 that is, as “the self–discipline of the
originative element in history” (FR: i), whose whose function is to “promote the art of life”
(FR: 2).16 Still, moving beyond the specific argument of the text, in which the cosmological
point of view coincides with the phenomenological-experiential one, I shall focus on a
single aspect of such a work: the nexus of reason with the dimension of the future.
17 In Symbolism (1927) the author introduced such a “pragmatic appeal to the future” (S: 31)
as a necessary aspect of philosophical investigation, remarkably, in Function of Reason this
aspect  receives  further  attention.  In  Whitehead’s  view,  reason  is  not  “a  passively
receptive substance” (S: 32), its value is of a “pragmatic, or even instrumental”17 kind: it is
not an object, because it always proves to be an essential minimal dynamic, an irreducible
one. This is why it is more appropriate to study it from the perspective of its function, and
it is just from the latter that Whitehead starts to rediscover and identify reason as “the
organ of emphasis upon novelty” (FR: 15). The author maintains that, without such an
organ,  the  one  which  proves  able  to  capture  and highlight  novelty,  there  would  be
nothing but mere repetition (that is, the sole thing to which rationalism can aspire), and
this would turn out to be nothing but the expression of a “stealthy inevitableness” (FR: i),
disowned by both the same progressing activity of reason and by experience. In other
words, at the cosmological level, Whitehead lays stress on the idea that nothing in the
universe  stands  unaltered,18 not  even  the  inorganic  matter,  whereas  what  is  to  be
acknowledged is a “tendency upwards, in a contrary direction to the aspect of physical
decay. In our experience we find appetition, effecting a finale causation toward ideal ends
which lie outside the mere physical tendency” (FR: 72), at whose peak is located reason
which, in its turn, even at its minimal levels, consists properly in “its judgments upon
flashes of novelty, of novelty in immediate realization and of novelty which is relevant to
appetition” (FR: 15).
18 Far from exhausting the issue in Whitehead’s thought, what emerges here equally and
with transparency is the same need manifested by James, i.e. that to connect – and almost
indentify – the proper object of reason, and therefore of philosophy (which uses reason as
its  distinctive instrument),  with the becoming,  that is,  with the new. As Deleuze has
sharply stressed, for Whitehead “the best of all worlds is not the one that reproduces the
eternal,  but  the one in which new creations  are  produced,  the one endowed with a
capacity for innovation or creativity” (Deleuze 1993: 89).
19 In a nutshell, then, this short text gives expression to both (a) a closeness, on Whitehead’s
part, to conception of reason entertained by Pragmatism, and (b) its “prospective” nature
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– to use James’s terminology – which goes over and above the regressive conceptual
analysis  proper to the rationalistic  view.  To better understand the aspects that have
emerged  here,  one  cannot  help  analyzing,  eventually  and  specifically,  the  peculiar
concept of experience and the reasons of the central role it plays within the philosophical
efforts made by the examined authors.
20 (3) Without intending to go over the many contributions offered on the confrontation
between empiricism and the concept of experience in James a Whitehead, a recovery of
this theme is required, besides the urgency to better understand the prospective role of
reason by bringing to light the specific experiential elements on which this hinges, to
show  the  essential  elements  which  underpin  and  make  the  respective  cosmologies
possible.
21 For better clarity, I therefore make a distinction between the method of James’s radical
empiricism  –  as  well  as  Whitehead’s  pan-experientialism19 –  and  the  conception  of
experience subsisting in both authors.
22 James  and  Whitehead  equally  feel  the  need  to  pose  experience  as  the  absolute  and
original ground, antecedent to any possible subject-object,  knower-known, mind-body
distinction; suffice it to say that, in his Modes of Thought, Whitehead draws James close to
Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz by highlighting the peculiarly modern style of his thought,
which he precisely characterizes as a “protest against the dismissal of experience in the
interest of system” (MT: 4). Hence, for both thinkers, such a need immediately becomes
an absolutely unavoidable methodological character.
23 (3a) As far as James is concerned, the phrase ‘radical empiricism’ is nothing but a possible
interpretation of Pragmatism. As he sharply states, once again, in his Essays in Radical
Empiricism:
The way of handling things I speak of, is, as you already will have suspected, that
known sometimes as the pragmatic method, sometimes as humanism, sometimes as
Deweyism, and in France, by some of the disciples of Bergson, as the Philosophie
nouvelle. […] I myself have given the name of ‘radical empiricism’ to that version of
the tendency in question which I prefer. (WWJ3: 79-80)
24 Radical  Empiricism opposes  itself  to  rationalism and  its  absolutistic20 and  monistic 21
tendencies  as  much as  to classical  empiricism,  since Radical  Empiricism rejects  their
conception of ‘pure datum,’ of a punctual, atomic and unrelated one, by claiming the
actuality  of  the  relations,  which  are  and  can  be  properly  experienced.  The  peculiar
character  of  this  approach  resides  in  its  referring  any  of  its  claims  to  the  field  of
experience, the latter understood as a dimension to which relations themselves belong,
being in this respect original and not derived. As James points out in his A World of Pure
Experience:
To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element
that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly
experienced.  For  such  a  philosophy,  the  relations  that  connect  experiences  must
themselves  be  experienced  relations,  and  any  kind  of  relation  experienced  must  be
accounted  as  ‘real’  as  anything  else  in  the  system.  Elements  may  indeed  be
redistributed, the original placing of things getting corrected, but a real place must
be found for every kind of thing experienced, whether term or relation, in the final
philosophic arrangement. (WWJ3: 22)
25 It  is  therefore  possible  to  understand  how  novelty,  which  underpins  the  pragmatic
method and sets it against all the previous “empiricisms,” relies on a radically different
concept of experience. Namely, an experience immediate but not punctual, structured but
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not defined, articulated but always dynamic, opened up, granted that – as the author
claims– “our fields of experience have no more definite boundaries than have our fields
of view. Both are fringed forever by a more that continuously supersedes them as life
proceeds” (WWJ3: 35).
26 With respect to this, however, it might legitimately be asked whether and in which way
the conception of experience as structured and continuous – the one that has just been
sketched out – can coexist in James’s reflection with the so called ‘pure experience,’ a
constant reminder of his whole radical empiricism. If the time at which such theses were
expressed cannot support the hypothesis of a meaningful chance of thought, given that
they both refer not only to the same span of years, but even to the same essays, can we
attribute such a fluctuation to an ultimate fundamental indecision? How else can such an
(apparent?) opposition be explained?
27 In order to answer these questions we should carefully reconsider the same passages in
which James displays the concept of pure experience. By way of example, let us consider
the following definition, occurring in Essays in Radical Empiricism:
‘Pure experience’  is  the name which I  gave to the immediate flux of  life  which
furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories. Only
new-born babes, or men in semicoma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows, may be
assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a that which is not yet
any definite what, tho ready to be all sorts of whats. (WWJ3: 46)
28 According to what  the passage reports,  it  would seem that  ‘pure experience’  can be
shown  only  in  a  negative  fashion,  uniquely  by  subtraction  from  our  most  daily
experience: when can we actually claim that we are making experience of a pure ‘that’?
What is claimed here is not certainly a minor outcome, granted that James re–assesses
the field of experience by broadening it, in relation to the exclusively epistemological
borders within which it had been situated from Kant onwards,22 but this still does not
help us to understand the compresence of two elements apparently so distant from each
other. Or, better stated, “this is not his unique merit: he offers a positive characterization,
through which experience is caught as a process, or as a stream […] that precedes any
theoretical  and  metaphysical  differentiation.  Experience  must  be  understood  as  a
development, as a process. It represents a complex set of occurrences which forge the
structure of the respective original process” (Schrag 1969: 489).23 For pure experience is,
as stated by the last of James’s quotations, an “immediate flux of life,” in which its purity
cannot be identified with something absolutely indistinct:24 within it, “the immediately
experienced conjunctive relations are as real as anything else” (WWJ3:45-46). In other
words, according to James “knowledge of sensible realities thus comes to life inside the
tissue of  experience.  It  is  made;  and made by relations that unroll  themselves in time”
(WWJ3:  29).25 We can then affirm that  James  holds  experience  to  be  a  process,26 and
although this does not deprive experience itself of the character of purity he attaches to
it. James himself asserts:
According  to  my  view,  experience  as  a  whole  is  a  process  in  time,  whereby
innumerable par- ticular terms lapse and are superseded by others that follow upon
them  by  transitions  which,  whether  disjunctive  or  conjunctive  in  content,  are
themselves experiences, and must in gen- eral be accounted at least as real as the
terms which they relate. (WWJ: 31-32)
29 It is not therefore necessary to alternatively opt for a concept of ‘pure’ experience or of
‘structured’ experience, on condition that we spell out the meaning of those terms. In
fact,  there  is  a  first  distinction which we might  detect  between that  and what,  pure
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experience and determined experience, which is unequivocally stated and that – in its
turn – is nevertheless to be understood as analysis and de-composition of a unique and
unitary moment.27 Then there is a second distinction, one which, although not definite in
James’s account, is still present and is necessary to lay down in order to understand both
his concept of experience and his peculiar radical empiricism, alongside the pluralism
which on such an empiricism relies.  Such a necessity is determined by our thought’s
habits, which lead us ‘naturally’ to conceive of experience in an atomic, punctual and
unrelated sense, whereas it is just this traditional mode of thought, linked to classical
empiricism, that the philosophy of James means to dismiss. The distinction, then, is that
between  this  punctual  concept  of  experience  and  the  concept  of  a  continuous  and
relationally informed experience, the latter type being the one endorsed by James. On
such  a  distinction  emerges  a  profound  affinity  with  Whitehead’s  speculation,  which
deepens and systematises some of the convictions here expressed.28
30 (3b) Whitehead comes close to an analogous empiricist perspective in those works which
have been regarded essays of epistemology or “pre-speculative philosophy” (Lowe 1990:
92), by displaying the same insistence on the relational character of the experiential flux.
Although in his thought any reference to “pure experience”29 is absent, in the centrality
attached to the concept of experience he points out the experience’s characteristics as
follows: i) unitariness; ii) extensionality; iii) relatedness; iv) processuality.30 Thus, if the
author affirms, as he does in The Anatomy of Some Scientific Ideas (1917), that “we conceive
ourselves each experiencing a complete time-flux (or stream) of sense˗presentation […]
distinguishable into parts” (AE: 128-129), such a flux exhibits itself, just qua flux, both as
(i) unicum and as (ii) extended. For it represents the “unit of things real” (SMW: 152), but
its nature is not punctual, given that – qua activity of flowing – it is not circumscribable to
an isolated spatio-temporal point,31 but is rather to be understood as a “continuum” (AE:
109).  Moreover  (iii)  such  a  flowing  is  for  Whitehead  always  structured,32 and  its
distinctive  structure  is  given  by  the  dynamic  interrelation  between  events,  which
constitute in some respect the “ultimate substance of nature” (CN: 19). Namely, that an
event is the «ultimate substance of nature» not in the same sense as the Aristotelian
upocheimenon, but as “this unit factor, retaining in itself the passage of nature” (CN: 75).
Furthermore, every event is in relation with the others and with the totality of events,
and this “relatedness does not just happen,  but is the skeleton of an active process of
becoming which […] is both a complex of objects and an outcome of other becomings”
(Lowe 1962: 202).33 (iv) Experience, then, presents itself as a “dynamic totality,”34 unitary
but not monolithic, united but not stable, always open and in a state of becoming, in
which the events that compose itself are themselves forms of becoming. It is starting
from an experience so conceived that Whitehead’s mature reflection will mould itself,
that is, starting from “the analysis of process as the realization of events disposed in an
interlocked community” (SMW: 152).  Finally,  just  as James’s  pure experience used to
overcome  the  classical  oppositions  of  epistemological  type  (subject/object;  knower/
known) in the same way “the metaphysical conception championed in Process and Reality
and in the coeval works is to be characterized as ontology of integral experience, irreducible
to the model grounded in the opposition between subject and object” (Vanzago 2001:
310).35
31 Such  an  “ontology  of  integral  experience”  can  be  translated,  from  a  strictly
methodological point of view, not so much into a form of empiricism as into one of “pan˗
experientialism.”36 Equipped with such a type of setting, Whitehead radicalizes some of
How Novelty Arises from Fields of Experience
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-1 | 2013
8
the  most  modern  claims,  just  as  James’s  pragmatic  one,  by  trying  nevertheless  to
systematize  them within  a  coherent  methodological  construction. For  in  Process  and
Reality the author sets up an ontology which is no longer grounded in the concept of
‘substance,’  but rather in that of ‘event,’  one which leads him to conceive a radically
different universe, whose processuality and becoming are not derivative and accidental
traits, but represent its original ground.
32 Just as the described experience, even if it is a continuum, reveals itself as a plurality of
reciprocally interlocked events, in the same way Whitehead’s universe is the compound
of all the actual entities, “the final real things, of which the world is made up” (PR: 18). The
word ‘entity’ is here taken up in the same sense that James uses in Does Consciousness Exist?
, by denying conscience itself the ‘entity status.’ As James points out in a letter addressed
to Peirce:
As for what entity may mean in general I know not, except it be some imperceptible
kind of being. In my article [Does Consciousness Exist?] it meant a constituent principle
of all experience, as contrasted with a certain function or relation between particular
parts of experience. The distinction seems to me plain enough. (CWJ10: 480)37
33 If consciousness is regarded by both authors as a function of experience, actual entities are
therefore its constitutive principle or, in other terms, the dynamic self-creating unities at
the basis of the universe. They do not refer, however, to any sort of substance, within the
borders of experience itself, as is revealed by the definition offered in the first pages of
Process and Reality: “The how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is;
so  that  the  two  descriptions  of  an  actual  entity  are  not  independent.  Its  ‘being’  is
constituted by its ‘becoming.’ This is the ‘principle of process’” (PR: 23). In other words,
on Whitehead’s view, an actual entity is:
An act of experience. The authority of William James can be quoted in support of
this conclusion. He writes: “Either your experience is of no content, of no change,
or  it  is  of  a  perceptible  amount  of  content  or  change.  Your  acquaintance  with
reality  grows  literally  by  buds  or  drops  of  perception.  Intellectually  and  on
reflection you can divide these into components, but as immediately given, they
come totally or not at all.” (PR: 68)38
34 Thus, the phrase ‘actual entity,’ as indicated by the quote above, shows some affinities,
not simply supposed, but even explicitly expressed, with James’s thought. As evidence of
this,  for  example,  these are properly defined by Whitehead as  “drops of  experience,
complex and interdependent” (PR: 18).
35 From such a rapid survey one can infer that, from the pre-eminence methodologically
accorded to experience and the widening of that concept, both authors take a sui generis
pluralistic  stance.  For  example,  in  the  metaphysical-cosmological  context  James  and
Whitehead are inclined to describe the universe as continuous and at the same time
discontinuous,  and they identify its  ground with drops  of  experience,  according to the
former, or with actual  entities,  according to latter.  In both cases,  we are faced with a
paradox: experience, the only field and horizon of philosophical speculation, reveals itself
as a profound unity, but the cosmology which derives from it is of pluralist order. More
specifically,  the  paradox  arises  from  the  fact  that,  starting  from  a  methodological
immanentistic assumption which in the one case takes the shape of radical empiricism and
in the other that of pan-experientialism, the thinkers at issue develop a “monadic theory”
of experience, one which coexists with a “pluralistic metaphysics."39
36 Can a similar stance be possibly sustained? How can it be justified? What kind of problems
does it have to cope with and what kind of problems are those to which it tries to offer a
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response? In order to clarify which answers are offered by the authors with regard to the
issue, it will be useful to face the problem of novelty, a theme to which the present work
will now direct its critical attention.
 
III. Between Experience and Pluralism: The Emergence
of Novelty
37 As  I  have  anticipated,  pluralism is  one  of  the  elements  of  affinity  between the  two
philosophers. According to Lowe, it should even be considered as “the subject of the most
obvious kinship between Whitehead and William James” (Lowe 1941a: 113). Still, thus far,
critical scholarship has never fully explored the view of the two authors in relation to the
theme of novelty, which figures not only among the objects of their speculative efforts,
but also and properly at the center of the delineation of a pluralistic universe.
38 In order to note the attention accorded by the authors to this problem suffice it to think
that James devotes to the theme of novelty the last five chapters of his Some Problems of
Philosophy, and that the ultimate of the metaphysical system outlined in Process and Reality
is ‘creativity,’ which is defined by the author himself as “principle of novelty” (PR: 21). In
other words,  we might  therefore say that  the whole cosmology of  the Whiteheadian
masterpiece  presupposes  and  testifies  to  this  phenomenon  of  novelty,  so  much  that
Whitehead can affirm that,  in its wholeness,  “the universe is a creative advance into
novelty” (PR: 222).40
39 In this context, then, far from considering in an exhaustive manner the problem and its
genesis in the reflection of the two authors, I shall confine myself to indicating those
aspects of the problem that are principally connected to the determination of a pluralistic
universe,  that  is,  to  showing  those  elements  which  prove  helpful  to  respond to  the
questions of the last paragraph. Let us therefore try to put the two forms of pluralism
into perspective.
40 If in the Essays in Radical Empiricism James claims that his philosophy “harmonizes best
with a radical pluralism, with novelty and indeterminism” (WWJ3: 44), such a possible
association is to be connected with the particular disjunctive-conjunctive character of
experience, already highlighted in the analyses, which is now taken up and applied to the
features of all the universe. As James himself declares in a passage of Pragmatism:
These forms of conjunction are as much parts of the tissue of experience as are the
terms  which  they  connect;  and  it  is  a  great  pragmatic  achievement  for  recent
idealism to have made the world hang together in these directly representable ways
instead of drawing its unity from the ‘inherence’ of its parts – whatever that may
mean  –  in  an  unimaginable  principle  behind  the  scenes.  ‘The  world  is  one,’
therefore,  just  so  far  as  we  experience  it  to  be  concatenated,  one  by  as  many
definite conjunctions as appear. But then also not one by just as many definite dis
junctions as we find. The oneness and the manyness of it thus obtain in respects
which can be separately  named.  It  is  neither a  universe pure and simple nor a
multiverse pure and simple. (WWJ1: 72-73)
41 It is therefore starting from the nexūs present in experience that the unity and plurality
of the universe are affirmed. As the author points out in A Pluralistic Universe,
Our ‘multiverse’ still makes a ‘universe’; for every part, tho it may not be in actual
or immediate connexion, is nevertheless in some possible or mediated connexion,
with  every  other  part  however  remote,  through  the  fact  that  each  part  hangs
together with its very next neighbors in inextricable interfusion. The type of union,
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it is true, is different here from the monistic type of alleinheit. It is not a universal
co-implication, or integration of all things durcheinander. It is what I call the strung-
along type, the type of continuity, contiguity, or concatenation […] the synechistic
type. (WWJ4: 146-47)
42 Thus  James’s  pluralistic  universe  does  not  fight  against  any  form of  ‘continuism’;  it
exclusively opposes monism. What is, then, the difference with monism? Where can the
evidence for this difference be more forcefully shown? According to the author, “towards
this issue, of the reality or unreality of the novelty that appears, the difference between
monism  and  pluralism  seems  to  converge”  (WWJ7:  74-75).  According  to  James,  the
rationalist theory, which he associates to monism,41 by offering a “rounded-in view of the
whole of things, a closed system of kinds” (WWJ7: 55) has operated – as a matter of fact –
an a priori exclusion of the possibility of a novelty, whereas pluralism dares to pose the
following question once again: “In what manner does new being come? […] Is it original?”
(WWJ7: 75),  or, again: “When perceptible amounts of new phenomenal being come to
birth, must we hold them to be in all points predetermined and necessary outgrowths of
the Being already there, or shall we rather admit the possibility that originality may thus
instil itself into reality?” (WWJ7: 76).
43 By making a stand with respect to these questions, the theory of pluralism departs from
monism. In fact, in tune with his pragmatic postulates, James answers to this question by
drawing on the field of experience:
We  do,  in  fact,  experience  perceptual  novelties  all  the  while.  Our  perceptual
experience overlaps  our conceptual  reason:  the that  transcends the why.  So  the
common-sense  view of  life,  as  something  really  dramatic,  with  work done,  and
things decided here and now, is acceptable to pluralism. (WWJ7: 73)42
44 We find two remarkable aspects here: (a) on the one hand, James confirms a distance
between the purely conceptual and the experiential ground; (b) on the other hand, in the
“ulteriority” of sense–experience he detects that possibility of novelty which rationalists
and monists cannot do anything but deny.
45 Notably, as far as the first aspect is concerned, the author claims that “whatever actual
novelty the future may contain (and the singularity and individuality of each moment
makes it novel) escapes conceptual treatment altogether. Properly speaking, concepts are
post-mortem  preparations,  sufficient  only  for  retrospective  understanding”  (WWJ7:
54-55); as for the second aspect, instead, on James’s view “the percepts are singulars that
change incessantly and never return exactly as they were before. This brings an element
of concrete novelty into our experience” (WWJ7:  54).  In particular,  James reports his
personal experience on the matter, psychological and also non-psychological, in order to
testify to both this hiatus between understanding and perceptual experience and this
irreducibility of novelty, which would witness its original being. As James in fact argues:
Psychologically  considered,  our  experiences  resist  conceptual  reduction  […].
Biography  is  the  concrete  form  in  which  all  that  is  is  immediately  given;  the
perceptual flux is the authentic stuff of each of our biographies, and yields a perfect
effervescence  of  novelty  all  the  time.  New  men  and  women,  books,  accidents,
events,  inventions,  enterprises,  burst unceasingly  upon  the  world.  It  is  vain  to
resolve these into ancient elements, or to say that they belong to ancient kinds, so
long as no one of them in its full individuality ever was here before or will ever
come again. Men of science and philosophy, the moment they forget their theoretic
abstractions, live in their biographies as much as any one else. (WWJ7: 78)
46 Therefore, novelty is for James inherent in and emerging from that “perceptual flux” which
represents the “substance of biography” proper to each of us. A flux which, on the one
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hand, consistently with the exposition of the concept of experience, is “the throughand-
through union of  adjacent  minima of  experience,  of  the confluence of  every passing
moment of concretely felt experience with its immediately next neighbors” (WWJ4: 147),
43 but which, on the other,  represents a continuous space of novelty in virtue of the
disjunctive relations in which its constitutive parts stand. As a consequence, sustaining a
pluralistic  universe  coincides  exactly  with  the  possibility  of  affirming  an  “additive
universe” (WWJ7: 103), to use the author’s own words, which echo the aforementioned
ones pronounced by Whitehead. For, on this point of view, one might support the view
that the two thinkers hold the same thesis: that they both describe the same universe,
that they both champion the same “creative advance of  the world” (PR:  345),  to use
Whitehead’s terminology.
47 Retrieving the questions from which this final part of the present work has begun, we
might  now understand how,  as  far  as  James  is  concerned,  there  is  no  incongruence
between the immanentism proper to the radical empiricism and the pluralism sustained in
a speculative-cosmological perspective.
48 Such a possibility of understanding is given by that broadening of the field of experience,
continuous and relationally informed, which exhibits itself not only as a wholeness of
irreducible elements, but also as a wholeness in which it becomes possible to think of the
emergence itself of irreducibility, of novelty. To summarise, we might otherwise say that
such a flux and such a novelty are for James effective, in that we can make experience of
them.  On  the  other  side,  however,  what  remains  in  the  author’s  reflection  is  a
discrepancy consisting in the idea that, if it is real and pragmatically correct to affirm
such  a  flux  and  novelty,  it  is  by  contrast  impossible  to  admit  any  conceptual
understanding of  them. For the author maintains that  “conception knows no way of
explaining save by deducing the identical from the identical,  so if  the world is to be
conceptually rationalized no novelty can really come” (WWJ7: 78), and it is precisely on
this point that Whitehead would utterly dissent from James.
49 In fact, Process and Reality can be read as an attempt to rationalize what James gives up.
Whitehead himself,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  Hartshorne,  having  indicated  the  bright
minded American philosopher as  a  “sensitive  genius” states  that,  on his  view,  he was
nevertheless “weak on Rationalization.”44 In order to better understand such a claim, let
us consider that, in his writings, on several occasions Whitehead distances himself both
from  those  philosophers  that  perpetrate  the  dogmatic  error  by  sustaining  the
“illusiveness and relative unreality of the temporal world,” both from those that, like
Bergson, maintain “that the intellect necessarily falsifies the notion of process.”45 In the
same way, even James – to his eyes – might be included within these philosophers who,
even without coming to conceive of intellect as ‘falsifying,’ identify any comprehensive
and  conceptual  advancing  of  the  intellect  with  the  one  proper  to  rationalism.  On
Whitehead’s view, instead, there is a third way, a properly conceptual one, one consisting
in the attempt not only to admit novelty, but also to understand and explain it. The central
point to be acknowledged for the author is, as the aforementioned passage indicates, the
concept of process. Its philosophical originality resides precisely in the attempt to rethink
such a concept throughout the peculiar form of pan-experientialism. A process which
does not set up a dialectic movement, as the one of Hegelian kind, one which, by way of
Aufhebung, comes to embrace everything into one single reality, but rather a process that
is  constant  advancement  of  novelty46 and,  at  the  same  time,  affirmation  of  the
irreducibility of its components.
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50 If we can claim, after the survey that has been conducted, that the main point of contact
between the two authors is that of pluralism, now on the basis of acknowledgement of a
new status for experience we should make a final point, noticing that their intellectual
journeys depart from each other far before the pluralistic conception outlined in their
mature  works.  For  if  pluralism  is  shared,  the  difference  is  to  be  identified  in  the
conception of experience, of its unity and modeling.
51 Eventually, on James’s view, the unity (plural and infinite) of experience is given and
experienced, but is ultimately impossible to grasp conceptually, whereas, on Whitehead’s
view, one can approach it through the concept of ‘process.’ Whitehead, in other words, in
the  attempt  to  understand  that  flux  which  James  takes  to  be  real  but  not
conceptualizable, after identifying it as a process tries to set up a true metaphysics of the
process, of a becoming which does not presuppose any substratum and does not involve
any identity posed as final term. The difficulty of its work actually resides in this aspect:
the attempt to rethink the cosmos in terms of becoming, process, without reference to
any creatio ex nihilo47 or appeal to whatever kind of transcendence. As the author claims:
There  are  two current  doctrines  as  to  this  process.  One is  that  of  the  external
Creator, eliciting this final togetherness out of nothing. The other doctrine is that it
is a metaphysical principle belonging to the nature of things, that there is nothing
in  the  Universe  other  than  instances  of  this  passage  and  components  of  these
instances. Let this latter doctrine be adopted. Then the word Creativity expresses
the notion that each event is a process issuing in novelty. (AI: 236)
52 To conclude, on this perspective, novelty in Whitehead is documented, justified and made
possible by the becoming of the actual entities – every actual entity is a “self-creating
creature” (PR: 85) – and from their multifarious, open relationships, which make up the
unicum  of  the  universe.  For  James,  instead,  novelty  is  simply  admitted,  stated  and
acknowledged in its maximally concrete value. It is maybe for this reason that Whitehead
can be indicated as a sui  generis forerunner of emergentism,48 even though the nexus
between emergentism and pluralism would require a new, further in-depth examination,
bearing  on  those  “fields  of  experience”  (WWJ3:  35)  to  which,  according  to  different
accents, James and Whitehead have always appealed.
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NOTES
1. Cf. in particular Lowe (1941a: 113-126), (1949: 267-296), and Schilpp 1941. Also, as far as the
Whiteheadian secondary literature is concerned, the interest towards confrontation has never
faded away, as the recent monograph by M. Weber shows: cf. Weber 2011.
2. I  follow  here  the  classical  tripartition  of  Whitehead’s  thought  worked  out  by  Metz  in  A
Hundred Years of British Philosophy and then taken up by Lowe. Cf. Metz 1938 and Lowe (1941b:
17).
3. Italics mine.
4. As Whitehead himself labels the two authors (SMW: 40, 145).
5. Whitehead is  indeed very timely in stressing that there is  no mere fact which is  by itself
neutral. With regard to this, see the whole discussion outlined both in Symbolism, which allows
us to understand the distance that separates Whitehead from naïve realism, and some passages
of Function of Reason, where the author – although addressing issues of different kind – claims:
“Nobody directs attention when there is nothing that he expects to see. The novel observation
which comes by chance is a rare accident, and is usually wasted. For it there be no scheme to fit it
into, its significance is lost” (FR: 57).
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6. Cf. also SMW: 143: “The scientific materialism and the Cartesian Ego were both challenged at
the same moment, one by science and the other by philosophy, as represented by William James
with his psychological antecedents; and the double challenge marks the end of a period which
lasted for about two hundred and fifty years.”
7. My italics. From a subsequent passage one can infer that Whitehead speaks here by constantly
keeping James’s work in his mind, given that he claims: “It is equally possible to arrive at this
organic conception of the world if we start from the fundamental notions of modern physics,
instead of, as above from psychology and physiology. In fact by reason of my own studies in
mathematics and mathematical physics, I did in fact arrive at myonvictions in this way” (SMW:
153).
8. 8  See  also  the  first  lesson  of  the  Modes  of  Thought,  in  which  Whitehead  includes  James
(alongside Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz) among the “great thinkers [in Western Literature], whose
services to civilized thought rest largely upon their achievements in philosophical assemblage.”
And also his well-known letter to Hartshorne (2nd January 1936), in which the author states: “my
belief is that the effective founders of the renascence in American philosophy are Charles Peirce
and William James. Of these men, W.J. is the analogue to Plato, and C.P. to Aristotle” (MT: 3). See
also Hartshorne (1972: xi).
9. In  order to  understand  the  nature  of  the  confrontation  and  so  avoid  any  kind  of
misunderstanding, it is useful to preliminarily bring to light a remark by Victor Lowe, one of
Whitehead’s first critics and his biographer. In an article published in 1949 he points out that the
relationship  between  James  and  Whitehead  ought  to  be  understood  more  in  terms  of
appreciation and sympathy than in terms of influence in the strict sense, also adding that in 1941
Whitehead, on the occasion of a personal conversation, had specified that “there was no question
of James affecting the direction of his thinking”; Lowe (1949: 289).  This observation does not
undermine the scientific nature of the relevant critical scholarship, even the most recent one
(suffice it to consider, with exclusive reference to the year 2011, Weber’s monograph and three
articles that appeared in the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy: Weber 2011,
Soelch 2011, Stenner 2011, Teixeira 2011); it rather allows to keep a distance be- tween the two
thinkers, and therefore a space of originality which makes the confrontation between them even
richer and profitable, without having to sacrifice any peculiar element of either in the name of
nexuses which are more supposed than given. Therefore, by dissociating myself from a radical
interpretation that would frame Whitehead’s speculative opus as a systematization of James’s
ideas (cf. Eisendrath 1971: xiii; Ford 1982: 107), I would like to survey that confrontation which
has been advanced in the last  years mainly by Weber’s  and Sinclair’s  works on the common
themes of (epochal) time, of feeling, of consciousness and of religion (cf. Sinclair 2009; Weber
2002, 2003, 2011), in the hope to provide further contribution to the comparison, concerning the
t opic of novelty.
10. 10 The aspects at issue are certainly expression of a tendency ‘vers le concret,’ to quote what
is probably the very first text which puts Whitehead in relation to James; Wahl 1932. Of such a
tendency, expressed by the American pragmatism as well as by Whitehead’s philosophy – not to
mention  Husserl’s  phenomenology,  although  with  a  different  emphasis  –  unquestionably
partakes also Bergson’s reflection. If the relationship of reciprocal respect between the latter and
James is well-known, largely ignored is the esteem which Bergson had for Whitehead. In fact, in
the years  that  immediately  preceded Whitehead’s  invitation to  teach in  the  States,  Bergson,
being asked for advice with regard to the names that might have restituted prestige to Harvard’s
faculty of philosophy, did not hesitate to define Whitehead as “the best philosopher writing in
English”; cf. Lowe (1990: 133).
11. My translation from Italian.
12. The immediacy of experience to which James refers his readers, as indicated by the previous
quotations, is starkly different from an understanding of the present as punctual and atomic. Far
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from being a stance assumed in the gnoseological  field,  such a perspective takes root in the
analysis of the proper concept of “experience,” so that, on the author’s view, the present time in
its  immediacy  already  implies  a  reference  to  the  future.  As  James  states:  “The  alternative
between pragmatism and rationalism, in the shape in which we now have it  before us,  is no
longer a question in the theory of knowledge, it concerns the structure of the universe itself. On
the pragmatist side we have only one edition of the universe, unfinished, growing in all sorts of
places, especially in the places where thinking beings are at work” (WWJ1: 124).
13. My italics.  With  the  aforementioned claim the  retrospective  perspective  is  by  no means
rejected. As James asserts in another passage of the quoted essays: “Life is in the transitions as
much as in the terms connected; often, indeed, it seems to be there more emphatically, as if our
spurts and sallies forward were the real firing-line of the battle, were like the thin line of flame
advancing across the dry autumnal field which the farmer proceeds to burn. In this line we live
prospectively as well as retrospectively. It is ‘of’ the past, inasmuch as it comes expressly as the
past’s continuation; it is ‘of’ the future in so far as the future, when it comes, will have continued
it” (WWJ3: 42).
14. Whitehead’s perspective – considered in relation to this text – is extremely sympathetic to
the pragmatic method,  which,  leaving aside the rest,  is  already explicitly evoked in the title
(Function of  Reason).  Such a  title  directly  echoes  those  arguments  worked out  by  James  on
consciousness, the latter being understood not as an entity, but as a function, and to the same
arguments Whitehead himself devotes some significant pages in Science and the Modern World.
Cf. James’s Does Consciousness Exist? in WWJ3: 3-19.
15. For a meticulous criticism of the space occupied by ‘reason’ in Whitehead’s philosophy and a
comprehensive analysis of the text at issue, see Abbagnano 1961.
16. With regard to this  issue,  I  shall  not dwell  on the parallelism subsisting between such a
definition and that  of  “education” worked out  by Whitehead in 1923 and contained in  “The
Rhythmic Claims of Freedom and Discipline”; cf. AE: 50. To such a topic I shall refer the reader to
Weber (2011: 15-17).
17. My own translation of Cafaro (1963: 11). On this aspect and on the affinities between the
concept of reason according to Whitehead and to American Pragmatism see also Rovatti (1969:
163).
18. In fact, within the framework of the universe, “what looks like stability is a relatively slow
process of atrophied decay. The stable universe is slipping away from under us” (FR: 66).
19. Cf. D. R. Griffin was the first who coined this term, precisely on the occasion of a conversation
with J. B. Cobb. Cf. Cobb/Griffin 1977.
20. In  “Absolutism  and  Empiricism”  James  points  out  that,  besides  the  distinctive  bent  of
absolutism to deny facts, “the one fundamental quarrel Empiricism has with Absolutism is over
this  repudiation  by  Absolutism  of  the  personal  and  aesthetic  factor  in  the  construction  of
philosophy” (WWJ3: 143).
21. 21 With regard to this see above and, among the numerous passages of James’s last writings,
these  synthetic  claims  taken  by  Pragmatism:  “Pragmatism  represents  a  perfectly  familiar
attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a
more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his
back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers.
He  turns  away  from  abstraction  and  insufficiency,  from  verbal  solutions,  from  bad  a  priori
reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns
towards  concreteness  and adequacy,  towards  facts,  towards  action and towards  power.  That
means the empiricist temper regnant, and the rationalist temper sincerely given up” (WWJ1: 51).
22. For an interesting critical analysis on the issue see Schrag (1969: 480-482).
23. My own translation from German.
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24. Although, notably, some passages make room for this interpretation. On the issue see what is
stated in WWJ3: 46: “Its [of experience] phases interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction
or of identity, can be caught. Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or
sensation. But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases, and these
salient parts become identified and fixed and abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot
through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions.”
25. First italics mine.
26. 26 Also Peirce, in a letter of 1905 addressed to James, criticizes his inaccurate expression of
experience, mentions that James tends to “describe it as a process.” Cf. CWJ10: 535. Peirce writes:
“As for your ‘pure experience,’ which you expressly say is a feeling, it seems to me ill-named
experience, which you describe as a process. But you never mean by experience what I mean, as
is evident from your amendment to my doctrine of pragmatism. Experience and an experiential
event or perception are,  for me,  utterly different,  experience being the effect  which life has
produced upon habits.  Apparently this is  something to which your theory pays little regard,
otherwise you could not call a feeling or sensation experience.”
27. In other words, the that is not chronologically prior to the what, which we might view as
matching our definite daily experience. From within the what, the necessary and specific content
of the that, it is always possible to grasp the that, – that is to say: the fact that it (a given thing) is,
– and to understand that this aspect overcomes and is not reducible to the content, indicated and
expressed in terms of what.  Cf.  WWJ1:  118:  “What we say about reality thus depends on the
perspective into which we throw it. The that of it is its own; but the what depends on the which;
and the which depends on us. Both the sensational and the relational parts of reality are dumb;
they say absolutely nothing about themselves. We it is who have to speak for them.”
28. Cf. my own translation of Bonfantini (1972: 118): “Among the thinkers who have influenced
Whitehead a central place is held by William James, not only and not so much for his pluralism as
for his  conception of  experience a  ‘structured lived experience,’  dominated by an immanent
relationalism, that is, for his anti -Humean and anti-atomistic empiricism.”
29. Such a concept, given its opening a window to possible anti-intellectualist or irrational drifts,
does not actually find any space in Whitehead, who rather supports, as we will shortly see, a
radical form of non naïve realism, defined by critical scholarship “pan-experientialism.” In fact,
on Whitehead’s view, the risk at stake is that of extending – opposite to any dogmatism – the
denial of its method to a denial of any type of method, discrediting, as a matter of fact and almost
completely, the same function of the philosophical practice. The author states: “Philosophy has
been afflicted by the dogmatic  fallacy,  which is  the belief  that  the principles  of  its  working
hypotheses are clear,  obvious,  and irreformable.  Then,  as  a  reaction from this  fallacy,  it  has
swayed to the other extreme which is the fallacy of discarding method. Philosophers boast that
they uphold no system. They are then a prey to the delusive clarities of detached expressions
which it is the very purpose of their science to surmount. Another type of reaction is to assume,
often tacitly, that if there can be any intellectual analysis it must proceeded according to some
one discarded  dogmatic  method,  and  thence  to  deduce  that  intellect  is  intrinsically  tied  to
erroneous fictions. This type is illustrated by the anti-intellectualism of Nietzsche and Bergson,
and tinges American Pragmatism” (AI: 287).
30. In  fact,  these  three  features  are  to  be  referred  to  a  span  of  time  wider  than  the
epistemological writings, in which Whitehead still lingers on attributing to the event the original
status as ‘process,’ describing it first and foremost as ‘extension.’ Only starting from the second
edition of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge the author will explicitly
claim, while commenting the first edition dating back to 1919: “The book is dominated by the
idea that the relation of extension has a unique preeminence and that everything can be got out
of it. During the development of the theme, it gradually became evident that this is not the case,
and cogredience had to be introduced. But the true doctrine, that ‘process’ is the fundamental
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idea, was not in my mind with sufficient emphasis. Extension is derivate from process, and is
required by it” (Whitehead 1924: 202).
31. This  point  is  for  Whitehead pure abstraction:  when should we ever experience a  similar
instant?  Remarkably,  the  author  claims that:  “The solution of  the  difficulty  is  arrived at  by
observing that the present is itself a duration, and therefore includes directly perceived time-
relation between events contained within it.  In other words we put the present on the same
footing  as  the  past  and  the  future  in  respect  to  the  inclusion  within  it  of  antecedent  and
succeeding events, so that past, present and future are in this respect exactly analogous ideas”
(AE: 186).
32. With regard to his inquiry on space and time, Whitehead speaks of “uniformity of the texture
of experience” (AE: 164).
33. My italics.
34. Cf. Vanzago (2001: 287).
35. My  own  English  translation  [italics  mine].  From  this  point  of  view,  various  in-depth
treatments  would  be  urgently  required.  I  cannot  but  refer  the  reader  here  to  other  critical
studies.  I  make  reference  here  to  a)  the  ‘emotional  ground’  proper  to  this  new  mode  of
conceiving  experience  and  hence  the  inclinations  and  the  feelings  that  forge  its inner
organization. Cf. Lowe 1941; b) the new way of conceiving subjectivity, as function in the case of
James and by way of introduction of the reformed subjectivist principle in Whitehead’s case. Cf.
Weber (2011: 21-24); Sinclair (2009: 116). With regard to this, suffice it to notice the continuous
closeness  of  the two authors from a methodological  point of  view.  According to James,  “the
principle of pure experience is also a methodical postulate. Nothing shall be admitted as fact, it
says, except what can be experienced at some definite time by some experient; and for every
feature of fact ever so experienced, a definite place must be found somewhere in the final system
of reality. In other words: Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of
thing experienced must somewhere be real” (WWJ3: 81), this is perfectly in line with the claim of
Whitehead’s reformed subjectivist principle, according to which “apart from the experiences of
subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness” (PR: 167).
36. For an exhaustive account of this term, now usually attached to Whitehead’s thought, cf.
Griffin 2007.
37. 37 Letter of September 30, 1904 addressed to C. S. Peirce.
38. Whitehead adds in footnote: “Some Problems of Philosophy, Ch. X; my attention was drawn to
this  passage  by  its  quotation  in  Religion  in  the  Philosophy  of  William  James,  by  Professor
J. S. Bixler” (PR: 68). With respect to the comparison between the theories of temporality and
epochal time in both authors, see also Texteira 2011 and Field 1983.
39. The  two  reported  syntagms  are  employed  by  Lowe  to  describe  Whitehead’s  position.
However, I believe that, in support of my thesis, they can equally be adopted for James’s position,
which  shows  this  complexity  and  paradoxicality,  already  at  the  level  of  the  analysis  of
experience,  with  that  peculiar  oscillation  between  pure  and  structured  experience  analyzed
above. Cf. Lowe (1949: 290).
40. Otherwise, the author goes on: “The alternative to this doctrine is a static morphological
universe” (PR: 222).
41. Cf. WWJ4: 9: “What do the terms empiricism and rationalism mean? Reduced to their most
pregnant difference, empiricism means the habit of explaining wholes by parts, and rationalism
means  the  habit  of explaining  parts  by  wholes.  Rationalism  thus  preserves  affinities  with
monism, since wholeness goes with union, while empiricism inclines to pluralistic views.”
42. A few lines before, the author affirms: “We can’t explain conceptually how genuine novelties
can come; but if one did come we could experience that it came” (WWJ7: 73).
43. 43 As the author goes on: “the recognition of this fact of coalescence of next with next in
concrete experience, so that all the insulating cuts we make there are artificial products of the
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conceptualizing  faculty,  is  what  distinguishes  the  empiricism  which  I  call  ‘radical’  from the
bugaboo empiricism of the traditional rationalist critics, which (rightly or wrongly) is accused of
chopping up experience into atomistic sensations, incapable of union with one another until a
purely intellectual principle has swooped down upon them from on high and folded them in its
own conjunctive categories” (WWJ4: 147).
44. Whitehead’s letter to Hartshorne, January 2, 1936, cit. in Lowe (1990: 346) [italics mine].
45. Whitehead  (1947:  116). Subsequently,  the  author  points  out  that  “There  are  these  two
prevalent  alternative  doctrines  respecting  the  process  apparent  in  the  external  world:  one,
which is Bergson’s view, is that the intellect in order to report upon experienced intuition must
necessarily  introduce  an  apparatus  of  concepts  which  falsify  the  intuition;  the  other  is  that
process  is  somewhat  superficial,  illusory  element  in  our  experience  of  eternally  real,  the
essentially permanent” (Whitehead 1947: 116).
46. Cf. PR: 222.
47. 47 Cf. Ford 1983.
48. 48 Cf. Zhok (2011: 7).
ABSTRACTS
The relationship between James and Whitehead has been underlined from the very outset by the
critical scholarship on Whitehead, as is testified by the presence of articles that appeared before
the  author’s  death.  By  dissociating  myself  from  the  radical  interpretation  that  frames
Whitehead’s speculative opus as a systematization of James’s ideas, I survey that confrontation
which has been advanced in the last years (Weber 2002, 2003, 2011, Sinclair 2009) in order to
provide further contribution, by tackle the problem of novelty. Precisely, I concentrate on those
instances, especially the methodological ones, which are not simply akin, but rather properly
shared by the authors. In other words, I focus on those grounding ideas from which they endorse
a pluralistic universe, conceived in connection with the problem of novelty. Properly, 1) I analyze
the way Whitehead refers to James in his books; 2) I  compare the roles they acknowledge to
reason, in the nexus with the concept of experience; 3) I show the importance both authors ascribe
to the problem of novelty, the main topic involved in their efforts to build up new cosmologies.
AUTHOR
MARIA REGINA BRIOSCHI
Università degli Studi di Milano
mariaregina.brioschi[at]unimi.it
How Novelty Arises from Fields of Experience
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-1 | 2013
20
